Also, your point about the Japanese mindset of never surrendering is spot on. It ultimately took the Emperor speaking to the nation on the radio to finally bring the war to a halt. The Emperor had never spoken on the radio and most Japanese had never heard his voice. He knew that if he spoke to the Japanese people directly he could bypass his generals and the war machine and stop them from controlling the entire populace. Hirohito probably saved millions of lives by stopping the war at that point.
Yep!
Also, the U.S. sent Japan communiques stating that the U.S. was in possession of weapons of such terrible destructive power and were prepared to use them without a full surrender. Japan was given a very fair chance to avoid the destruction, but they chose to ignore warnings. Culturally, surrender just wasn’t something Japan could do… until sadly, two cities were vaporized, innocent lives lost, and even more innocent lives altered forever. Japan had been unbowed through centuries of conflict, but this wound was too great to preserver further.
The likely other path was U.S. troops in pitched combat with what remaining army Japan had and women and children. Terrible choice either way.
I'm still of the opinion that a longer pause could have been taken between the two drops.
My reading of the timeline of events in August 1945 has always been something like --
Japan never thought they'd "win" the war in the sense they'd be rolling into Washington, DC or New York at some point in the future (or, as much as
The Man in the High Castle likes to dramatize it, at least San Francisco and Los Angeles). They knew they couldn't win a long and protracted war of attrition with the U.S., so the goal was always to force a stalemate on terms favorite to Japan and come to the negotiating table where they could keep their "Co-Prosperity Sphere" empire together.
They envisioned this coming to be through a Japanese victory in some "climactic battle" that would not win the war from a material standpoint -- again, they knew they could never win a battle of attrition -- but would raise the cost of an American victory to such a high degree and set the U.S. back maybe years until its material advantages would win the war that the Americans... would just retire.
Not worth it for the Americans at that point, right?
You can see the obvious influence of the Battle of Tsushima there. The Japanese could not win a war of attrition with the Russians, but they made the costs so high by implementing an "efficient" strategy to the point the Russians gave up the game. The plan just had two problems they never addressed...
(1.) The raid on Pearl Harbor was a tactical victory but a strategic disaster. They felt they had to, being so afraid of the American battleships stationed there, but a few months of the Pacific War showed quickly that were "role players" in the fleet compared to submarines and land- and carrier-based aircraft. Yeah, they sunk a few near-obsolete battleships -- most of which were repaired -- but so what?
The main thing it did was piss us off. Not how you want to start a war if the whole idea is to make it so the American people grow bored or tire of the war (such as we do nowadays) and quit.
(2.) They ****** up the execution. Midway was basically their plan -- but in the other direction. Build a chain of island fortresses in the central and south Pacific protecting the core of their empire, fortify them with dug-in troops and land-based aircraft, and use their mobile carrier fleet to repel any invasions. Sure, the U.S. can probably wear that down over time, but that was going to take a while and lead to heinous losses if every time you did this you had to trade carriers at a 3:1 or a 4:1 ratio or so.
Instead they tried it themselves, ****** around and found out, and their whole plan was shot. They kept trying to do the same thing over and over again the rest of the war, but it never worked. This was still their plan in anticipation of the Allied invasion of the Home Islands -- put up hellacious resistance, make the U.S. question if this is really worth the cost, and find somebody to mediate the peace.
The obvious mediator was always the Soviet Union. The Soviets and Japanese had a non-aggression pact, Japan tolerated Lend-Lease shipments to the USSR through Vladivostok without attacking them, and the U.S. and Moscow were nominal "allies" against the Germans in Europe. Japan hoped they could force that stalemate and call up our "mutual friend" Stalin and see if he'd help them talk this out.
Again, stupid plan, but they were reaching in desperation.
August 6 = Hiroshima
August 7 = message from Truman is delivered via the Swiss embassy, which was the
de facto backdoor for the U.S. and Japan to communicate, that the bombings will continue until surrender
This was something of a bluff. They had only two bombs at that point. More would take months.
August 8 = Soviets declare war on Japan (which was requested by the Allies once the war in Europe was over... thinking Soviet troops would be useful to soak up the casualties that were going to come from invading Japan, though I shudder to think of a partitioned Japan like Germany)
August 9 = Nagasaki
August 10 = Japan surrenders with the single condition that the Emperor remain sovereign
Historians still debate which one of these factors -- the destruction from the atomic bombs or the final collapse of their plan for Soviet mediation -- was the stronger influence. But it was a combination of the two. Japanese military leadership had been telling Hirohito for months that the Soviets would intervene and help broker a peace deal any day now. That became impossible to assert when they attacked.